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TAKE CARE, MR. PRESIDENT
EUGENE GRESSMANt
On December 17, 1984, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), David Stockman, acting on the advice of the Attorney General
of the United States, issued a directive' to all heads of executive departments
and agencies to disregard certain provisions of the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984.2 The directive was premised on the Attorney General's conclusion
that two bid protest provisions of that Act "are unconstitutional because they
purport to authorize the Comptroller General to exercise Executive authority in
violation of the principle of Separation of Powers."
3
In my judgment, the directive constitutes a willful disobedience of the will
of Congress as expressed in the two bid protest provisions. In our constitutional
system of government, such a refusal by the Executive to "take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed" 4 cannot and must not be tolerated. The bases for
t William Rand Kenan Professor of Constitutional Law, School of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; also, Special Counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives since 1976 in the
"one-House veto" litigation, including INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). This Observation is
based on remarks made by the author before the House Committee on Government Operations on
February 28, 1985. See Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1985)
(containing a more extensive discussion by Professor Gressman of the Executive's lack of constitu-
tional authority to refuse to execute legislation believed to be unconstitutional).
1. Bulletin No. 85-8 from Director of Office of Management and Budget to Heads of Execu-
tive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 17, 1984), in Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function.
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1985) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. In pertinent part, the OMB bulle-
tin directed that:
Agencies shall take no action, including the issuance of regulations, based upon the
invalid provisions.
With respect to the "stay" provision, agencies shall proceed with the procurement
process as though no such provision were contained in the Act....
With respect to the damage provision of the Act, agencies shall not comply with dec-
larations of awards of costs, including attorneys' fees or bid preparation costs, made by the
Comptroller General.
Id. at 463.
2. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (enacted as part
of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253). The constitutionality
of the Executive's refusal to execute the Competition in Contracting Act was addressed in Ameron,
Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F. Supp. 750, 755-56 (D.N.J. May 28, 1985).
3. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 462. The Competition in Contracting Act was held
not to violate the separation of powers doctrine in Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 607
F. Supp. 962, 970-73 (D.N.J. March 27, 1985) (plaintiff applied for order to show cause to prelimina-
rily restrain defendant from performing on government contract). The United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey repeated this holding in Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 610 F. Supp. 750, 756-57 (D.N.J. May 28, 1985) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
granted). See also Comment, GAO Bid Protest Procedures Under the Competition in Contracting Act.
Constitutional Implications After Buckley and Chadha, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 485 (1985) (discussing
constitutionality of the Competition in Contracting Act).
4. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3, c. 3.
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my judgment in this respect can be summarized as follows:
(1) Whatever the merits or the sincerity of the Executive's constitutional
doubts about the statutory provisions in question, the central fact is that the
Constitution nowhere excuses the President from fulfilling his vested obligation
to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." "It is a startling notion,"
Raoul Berger has written, that a President "may refuse to execute a law on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. To wring from a duty faithfully to execute
the laws a power to defy them would appear to be a feat of splendid illogic." s
Put differently, once a bill has passed through all the constitutional forms of
enactment and has become a law, perhaps even over a presidential veto
grounded on constitutional objections, the President has no option under article
II but to enforce the measure faithfully. The Constitution simply does not give
the President "the power to defeat the will of the people or of the legislature as
embodied in law."' 6 As Professor Corwin has written, "[O]nce a statute has been
duly enacted, whether over his protest or with his approval, [the President] must
promote its enforcement."
'7
(2) The President's article II duty to execute the laws, as Justice Holmes
once wrote, "is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require [the Presi-
dent] to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." To
faithfully execute a law, the President must be faithful precisely to what Con-
gress has written into the law, no more and no less. Once the Executive over-
steps the bounds of faithfulness, either by adding to or subtracting from what
Congress has provided, then the separation of powers equilibrium established by
our constitutional system tilts dangerously toward the executive branch.
(3) The Supreme Court's ruling in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer 9 teaches that
when the President tries to do more than he is permitted by statute, he becomes
a lawmaker, a status foreign to the constitutional division of power. Certainly,
as the Youngstown Court said, "[T]he President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." 10 Rather, the
Constitution places the lawmaking function exclusively in the hands of Con-
gress.'1 Thus, the President's power of execution does not include the power of
affirmatively adding to what the legislative body has provided.
(4) By the same token, the Executive's power of execution does not include
a power to ignore or disobey what Congress has provided. A president who
disobeys or refuses to execute a portion of a statute engages in the same sort of
negative Executive lawmaking that precipitated the impoundment crisis of a
5. R. BERGER, ExEcUTIvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306 (1974).
6. 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1503 (2d ed.
1929).
7. E. CORWiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 79 (3d ed. 1948).
8. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
10. Id. at 587.
11. The Youngstown Court observed that the Constitution reserves to the legislature the power
to "make laws which the President is to execute." Id.
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decade ago. 12 Such refusal to execute, even though due to constitutional doubts
about the statute, amounts to a partial repeal of the statute-a repeal that consti-
tutionally can be effected only through the normal legislative processes. The
principles enunciated in Youngstown 13 bar negative lawmaking by the Execu-
tive. 14 These principles are at the heart of a comment on the President's im-
poundment authority made by Justice Rehnquist in 1969 while serving as an
Assistant Attorney General:
It is in our view extremely difficult to formulate constitutional theory
to justify a refusal by the President to comply with a Congressional
directive to spend. It may be argued that the spending of money is
inherently an executive function, but the execution of any law is, by
definition, an executive function and it seems an anomalous proposi-
tion that because the Executive Branch is bound to execute the laws, it
is free to decline to execute them)
5
(5) The ultimate irony here is that the Executive's protest that Congress
has authorized the Comptroller General to exercise executive authority is raised
by means of an executive invasion of the legislative powers of Congress-a "non-
execution" repeal of the challenged provisions of the Competition in Con-
tracting Act. The Executive is attempting to read article II "as giving the
President not only the power to execute the laws but to make [and unmake]
some." 16 Moreover, the Executive is seeking to use article II not only as a vehi-
cle for executing legislative powers, but also as a mechanism for testing the con-
stitutionality of the statutory provisions. There certainly are better methods of
securing judicial review of those provisions than by an executive violation of the
separation of powers doctrine and by an executive refusal to "take care that the
[Competition in Contracting Act] be faithfully executed."
17
12. In 1973 President Richard M. Nixon claimed inherent constitutional power in the Execu-
tive to refuse to spend money appropriated by Congress--the power to "impound." He argued that
this power arose if spending the appropriated funds would lead to increased prices or increased
taxes. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361 (11th ed. 1985). The impoundment controversy
engendered lengthy discussion in legal literature. See, eg., Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Im-
poundment Part ." Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEo. L.J. 1549 (1974);
Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I. Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 GEo.
L.J. 149 (1974).
In 1974 Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, which restricts the Executive's ability to impound. The Act re-
quires congressional approval before the Executive ends or reduces congressionally funded pro-
grams. G. GUNTHER, supra, at 361-62.
13. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
14. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) ("To contend that the
obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid
their execution [for whatever reason], is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely
inadmissible.").
15. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 284 (2d ed.
1983) (quoting Memorandum Re Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for
Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools (Dec. 1, 1969)).
16. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. As I elaborated in a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Government
Operations:
There are any number of legitimate ways in which the validity of most lavs can be tested
by some private citizen with standing to object, but Executive disobedience is not one of
them. In fact, Executive disobedience serves to add an unduly complicating dimension to
1986]
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(6) Finally, the foregoing sentiments do not imply that the President is
without power to make his own assessment of the constitutionality of statutes,
either before or after their final enactment. As we witnessed when "one-House
veto" legislation was challenged in INS v. Chadha, 18 the Executive can refuse to
defend the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly
instituted. But this right is a far cry from saying that the Executive may express
his constitutional displeasure with a duly enacted statute by ignoring or refusing
to execute it in the first instance. Such inaction by the Executive strikes at the
very fabric of the separation of powers doctrine. Congress should take prompt
action to repair the jagged tear in that fabric created by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's directive of December 17, 1984.
the judicial review process, for then judicial review can be had only by the citizen injured
by the Executive disobedience rather than by the citizen injured by the law itself.
If the Executive were to execute the provisions in question, any party injured by the
execution would have standing to seek judicial review. The Executive would still have the
privilege of refusing to defend the validity of the provisions he has executed, in which event
the House and Senate would doubtless intervene or be invited to provide the necessary
defense. That was precisely the procedure followed in the Chadha one-House veto litiga-
tion, where the Executive respected and executed the veto procedures [before] the injured
party sought judicial review.
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 81.
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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